Bookmarks 2026-04-18T18:00:33.477Z
by Owen Kibel
56 min read
Bookmarks for 2026-04-18T18:00:33.477Z
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Schematik Is âCursor for Hardware.â Anthropic Wants In | WIRED Added: Apr 18, 2026
They Built the âCursor for Hardware.â Now, Anthropic Wants In
Site: WIRED
Schematik is a program that aims to help people vibe code for physical devices. Hopefully, it wonât blow anything up.
Beek, based in Amsterdam, admits he is not a hardware guy. But he had that itch and now really just wanted to make something that wouldnât explode. âThat's the difference: Your fuses blow out, or you have a solid product,â Beek says. âThat was kind of a learning experience for me to be more careful, but also to build AI that deeply understands what it's talking about.â He switched his requests to Anthropicâs Claude, then rejiggered that into an assistant program he calls Schematik and has described, over and over again, as âCursor for Hardware.â The idea of Schematik is essentially vibe coding for physical devices. Tell the program what you want to make, and it will suggest just about everything you need to build it out in the real world and share links to where you can buy the individual wires and pieces. Then, it will serve as a guide for putting it all together. Beek plans to make money off it eventually and is working on getting investors. (It just got $4.6 million from venture capitalist firm Lightspeed Venture Partners.) But you can go use it to build something right now. When Beek posted on X about the idea in February, it got lots of traction. Other tinkerers gave it a shot, describing what they wanted to make and then building it out. Marc Vermeeren, who leads branding at N8N, a European AI company, says he has made several devices, from an MP3 player to a Tamagotchi-style bot called Clawy that helped him manage Claude coding sessions. (Other people have created their own takes on the design, like a Clawy that looks like Paulie Walnuts from The Sopranos.) âThere's no blocker for your creativity anymore,â says Vermeeren, who is now also investing in Schematik. âThat's why I'm so excited about it and building stuff constantly.â Heâs not the only one. On Thursday, Anthropic engineer Felix Rieseberg posted on X to announce that Anthropic has now enabled âa little Bluetooth API for makers and developers, allowing you to build hardware devices that interact with Claude.â He also shared a picture and a GitHub link for a device that looks very similar to Vermeerenâs Clawy, though Rieseberg and Anthropic did not reply to WIREDâs request for comment about whether it was directly inspired by Beekâs or Vermeerenâs work. âIf I inspired someone with it, Iâm proud,â Vermeeren says. âIf Anthropic built an official feature because of it, Iâm even prouder.â Just about every AI tech company seems to be making some kind of hardware device, whether itâs a giant like OpenAI, the big chipmakers, or more niche wearables. Beyond that, there have always been crowds of tinkerers and makers looking to build tech, whether itâs to turn vapes into synthesizers or push back against ICE. âThe big problem in hardware is that it's very gatekept and that very few people can do it,â Beek says. âI really hope that my tool can help enable more people to build, either with the tool or to learn how to build hardware through the tool.â Vibe coding in software has its own sort of bad rap, given that it can lead to big vulnerabilities in software. Itâs possible that vibe coding hardware gets to that point too, or devolves into a slog of infinite hardware-slop. âWith languages or images, LLMs are much more subjective about whatâs right or wrong,â Beek says. âThe nice thing about electronics is that it's pure physics, so you can actually check.â Beek says he wants to make sure that Schematik wonât help people make anything that will actually blow up. The service currently only helps build devices on lower-voltage architecture, three or five voltages at most. That should be enough to power internet of things devices or gadgets like music players. (Beek does say that the ultimate goal is making humanoids one day.) âI think this is a promising direction and where we need to go,â says Kyle Wiens, CEO of iFixit, which tears down devices to gauge how repairable they are. He says he hasnât used Schematik but thinks it could be useful. He notes that electronics design can be very complex, often requiring sorting through many different SKUs and ensuring compatibility of all the pieces. âThat is just a super hard problem,â Wiens says. âThis kind of scale is the sort of thing that AIs are good at.â âThe last five years, actually, in software have been incredible; everything has become so easy and fast,â Beek says. âIn hardware, everything is still the same as it was in the past 10, 20 years. There was very little change, and there were very little advancements with AI.â
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What are the details regarding the recent attack on Sam Altman and public backlash against AI? - Google Search Added: Apr 18, 2026
Google Search
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Universal Basic Income Is Coming, Elon Musk Says AI Will Create UBI For Humanity - YouTube Added: Apr 18, 2026
Universal Basic Income Is Coming, Elon Musk Says AI Will Create UBI For Humanity
Site: YouTube
SUPPORT THE SHOW BUY CAST BREW COFFEE NOW - https://castbrew.com/Join - https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCLwNTXWEjVd2qIHLcXxQWxA/joinHosts: Tim @Timcast (eve...
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What's Special About Trump?
Site: YouTube
Please remember to subscribe if you enjoyed this episode of Pod Force One: https://www.youtube.com/@PodForce1Watch full clips of Pod Force One with Miranda D...
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Guy Starts Playing Piano in Cafeteria⌠Then THIS Happens
Site: YouTube
Shostakovich Waltz No 2 flashmob at the BYU dining hall W/ @RobLandes @petertrombone Free 30 day piano course: https://www.pianote.com/andymorris?oid=182&aff...
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I Guess The Artemis Mission Might Be Fake⌠But Not For These Reasons (Fallacy Fallacy Explained)
Site: YouTube
People are making some wild claims about the Artemis II missionâgreenscreens, fake astronauts, invisible satellitesâŚBut hereâs the problem: even when these a...
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Beatbox Legend VS Beatbox World champion đł @verbalase vs @Improverbbx #beatbox
Site: YouTube
Enjoy the videos and music you love, upload original content, and share it all with friends, family, and the world on YouTube.
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Waldemar Malickiâs Nokia Ringtone Improvisation #piano #classicalmusic #pianotutorial #synthesia
Site: YouTube
Enjoy the videos and music you love, upload original content, and share it all with friends, family, and the world on YouTube.
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How Google Gemma 4 Achieves 70B Performance With 2.3B Parameters - Geeky Gadgets Added: Apr 18, 2026
How Google's 2.3B Gemma 4 Model Rivals 70B Giants on Just 1.5GB of RAM
Site: Geeky Gadgets
Google's open-source Gemma 4 model brings 70B-level reasoning to edge devices using just 2.3B parameters and 1.5GB of RAM for offline AI tasks.
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I found a Gemini feature so good, I deleted a bunch of apps
Added: Apr 18, 2026I found a Gemini feature so good, I deleted a bunch of apps
Site: Android Police
Get ready for a cleaner home screen
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Gemma 4 just replaced my whole local LLM stack
Added: Apr 18, 2026
Gemma 4 just replaced my whole local LLM stack
Site: MakeUseOf
Gemma 4 made local LLMs feel practical, private, and finally useful on everyday hardware.
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Scoop: Trump convenes Iran situation room meeting amid renewed Hormuz crisis Added: Apr 18, 2026
Scoop: Trump convenes Iran situation room meeting amid renewed Hormuz crisis
Site: Axios
The situation with Iran is at a critical point, with the ceasefire expected to expire in three days.
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Artemis 2's heat shield seems to have aced its trial by fire | Space Added: Apr 18, 2026
Artemis 2's heat shield seems to have aced its trial by fire
Site: Space
"We leaned under and looked at the bottom of that thing, and for four humans just looking at the heat shield, it looked wonderful to us."
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People with dark personality traits are naturally inclined towards leadership roles, finds new study Added: Apr 18, 2026
People with dark personality traits are naturally inclined towards leadership roles, finds new study
Can you tell if you're working with a narcissist or a psychopath? A new study suggests that people's job choices may offer some clues, especially in fields built on leadership and persuasion such as business, politics, and law, where such darker traits are more common. Those in creative fields or nature-focused work may be more likely to encounter individuals with a Machiavellian way of thinking, according to findings published in Personality and Individual Differences.
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You Are Not Prepared to Learn the Size of Neanderthal Infants
Added: Apr 18, 2026You Are Not Prepared to Learn the Size of Neanderthal Infants
Site: Futurism
Neanderthals babies were bigger and grew quicker than typical modern infants, a team of scientists discovered.
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Site: X (formerly Twitter)
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Mikhaila Peterson on X: "https://t.co/4XMaocvTu5 if you want to share your story." / X Added: Apr 18, 2026
Site: X (formerly Twitter)
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Site: X (formerly Twitter)
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Chemically Castrated: A Growing Pharmaceutical Crisis Among Young Adults | by Iatrogenic Awareness | Mar, 2026 | Medium Added: Apr 18, 2026
Chemically Castrated: A Growing Pharmaceutical Crisis Among Young Adults
Site: Medium
This year, Iâm turning 30. I havenât felt an orgasm since I was 24 years old.
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What caffeine does to ants could change pest control | ScienceDaily Added: Apr 18, 2026
What caffeine does to ants could change pest control
Site: ScienceDaily
Caffeine doesnât just perk up humansâit can sharpen antsâ minds too. Invasive Argentine ants given caffeinated sugar learned to find food much more efficiently, taking straighter paths and reducing travel time by up to 38%. They werenât faster, just more focused, indicating improved learning. This unexpected effect could make pest control baits far more effective.
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Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang ânearly lost his composureâ when pressed on selling chips to China â âYouâre not talking to someone who woke up a loserâ | Tom's Hardware Added: Apr 18, 2026
Nvidia CEO Jensen Huang ânearly lost his composureâ when pressed on selling chips to China â âYouâre not talking to someone who woke up a loserâ
Site: Tom's Hardware
The Nvidia boss says that keeping Chinese AI researchers using the American tech stack is a good thing for the U.S.
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The End of Children | The New Yorker Added: Apr 18, 2026
The End of Children
Site: The New Yorker
Birth rates are crashing around the world. Should we be worried?
âThe Population Bombâ transformed regional unease into a global panic. India, in less than two years, subjected millions of citizens to compulsory sterilization. China rolled out a series of initiativesâculminating in the infamous one-child policyâthat included punitive fines, obligatory IUD insertions, and unwanted abortions. Ehrlich can hardly be blamed for the most coercive incarnations of population control. He might, however, be accused of impeccable comic timing. By the time âThe Population Bombâ was published, the population-growth rate had already peaked. For hundreds of thousands of years, we had gone forth and multiplied. This epoch was coming to an end. The âtotal fertility rateâ is a coarse estimate of the number of children an average woman will bear. A population will be stable if it reproduces at the âreplacement rate,â or about 2.1 babies per mother. (The .1 is the statistical laundering of great personal tragedy.) Anything above that threshold will theoretically generate exponential expansion, and anything below it will generate exponential decay. In 1960, the tiny country of Singapore had a fertility rate of almost six. By 1985, it had been brought down to 1.6âa rate that threatened to roughly halve its population in two generations. As the economist Nicholas Eberstadt told me, âFor two decades, the leaders of Singapore said, âOh, uncontrolled fertility has terribly dangerous consequences, so the rate has to come down,â and then, after a semicolon, without even catching their breath, said, âWait, I mean go up.â â The nationâs leaders launched a promotional campaign: âHave-Three-or-More (if you can afford it).â Singaporeans were known to be good national sports, but, despite the catchiness of the slogan, they proved noncompliant. From one nation to the next, the nightmare of too many descendants turned into the nightmare of too few. In 2007, when Japanâs total fertility rate hit 1.3, a conservative government minister referred to women as âbirth-giving machines.â This didnât go over particularly well with anyone, including his wife. Today, declining fertility is a near-universal phenomenon. Albania, El Salvador, and Nepal, none of them affluent, are now below replacement levels. Iranâs fertility rate is half of what it was thirty years ago. Headlines about âEuropeâs demographic winterâ are commonplace. Giorgia Meloni, the Prime Minister of Italy, has said that her country is âdestined to disappear.â One Japanese economist runs a conceptual clock that counts down to his countryâs final child: the current readout is January 5, 2720. It will take a few years before we can be sure, but itâs possible that 2023 saw the world as a whole slump beneath the replacement threshold for the first time. There are a couple of places where fertility remains higherâCentral Asia and sub-Saharan Africaâbut even there the rates are generally diminishing. Paranoia has ensued. In the past year, hundreds of men in the Central African Republic have reported the presumably delusional belief that their genitals have gone missing. In Nigeria, where the fertility rate has fallen from seven to four, a widely read tabloid blamed a conspiracy of perverts in the French intelligence services who had been âusing secret nanotechnology innovations to steal penises from African men in order to reverse the extinction of Europeans unwilling to bear children.â The phenomenon exerts a peculiarly deranging force, and until recently Americans remained oblivious. In the past two decades, however, the American fertility rate has dropped roughly twenty per cent, to 1.6. The right wing sees depopulation as a greater threat than climate change. Elon Musk describes it as âthe biggest danger civilization faces by far,â and is trying, in his quiet way, to compensate on his own. He has sired, at least in a technical sense, thirteenish known children, and has reportedly offered the dispensation of his sperm to friends, employees, and people he met once at a dinner party. (Musk denies this. Skeptics of the strategy, though, might recall that Genghis Khan, according to legend, had more than a thousand offspring.) Vice-President J. D. Vance has blamed this âcatastrophic problemâ on the âchildless left.â Liberals more often dismiss the issue, not without reason, as scaremongering in service of the Republican assault on reproductive rights. Some go further: a dwindling population is a more environmentally sustainable one. Anyone who offers a confident explanation of the situation is probably wrong. Fertility connects perhaps the most significant decision any individual might make with unanswerable questions about our collective fate, so a theory of fertility is necessarily a theory of everythingâgender, money, politics, culture, evolution. Eberstadt told me, âThe person who explains it deserves to get a Nobel, not in economics but in literature.â The global population is projected to grow for about another half century. Then it will contract. This is unprecedented. Almost nothing else can be said with any certainty. Here and there, however, are harbingers of potential futures. South Korea has a fertility rate of 0.7. This is the lowest rate of any nation in the world. It may be the lowest in recorded history. If that trajectory holds, each successive generation will be a third the size of its predecessor. Every hundred contemporary Koreans of childbearing age will produce, in total, about twelve grandchildren. The country is an outlier, but it may not be one for long. As the Korean political analyst John Lee told me, âWe are the canary in the coal mine.â Portents of desolation are everywhere. Middle-aged Koreans remember a time when children were plentiful. In 1970, a million Korean babies were born. An average baby-boomer classroom had seventy or eighty pupils, and schools were forced to divide their students into morning and afternoon shifts. It is as though these people were residents of a different country. In 2023, the number of births was just two hundred and thirty thousand. A baby-formula brand has retooled itself to manufacture muscle-retention smoothies for the elderly. About two hundred day-care facilities have been turned into nursing homes, sometimes with the same directors, the same rubberized play floors, and the same crayons. A rural school has been repurposed as a cat sanctuary. Every Korean has heard that their population will ineluctably approach zero. Cho Youngtae, a celebrity demographer at Seoul National University, said to me, âAsk people on the street, âWhat is the Korean total fertility rate?â and they will know!â They often know to two decimal places. They have a celebrity demographer. Outside of Seoul, children are largely phantom presences. There are a hundred and fifty-seven elementary schools that had no new enrollees scheduled for 2023. That year, the seaside village of Iwon-myeon recorded a single newborn. The entire town was garlanded with banners that congratulated the parents by name âon the birth of their lovely baby angel.â One village in Haenam, a county that encompasses the southern extremity of the Korean peninsula, last registered a birth during the 1988 Seoul Olympics. Haenam disappears into the sea at a windswept cape called Ttangkkeut, or âEnd of the World.â Not far away, there is a school that once had more than a thousand elementary-age students. When I visited, in November, it had five. A pastel rainbow brightened the façade, and out front was a statue of a singlet-clad boy with a raised torch; the plinthâs inscription read âPhysical strength is national strength.â A pair of slippers had been left for me at the entryway, beside a trophy case crowded with bygone glories and a laminated poster that introduced the names and career aspirations of the three first graders (policeman, architect, idol singer) and the two sixth graders (truck driver, fighter pilot). In a memorable scene in Alfonso CuarĂłnâs 2006 film, âChildren of Men,â a dystopian vision of a sterile world, a deer bounds through a trash-strewn school hallway. Here, dereliction was kept at bay: the corridors were bright, broom-swept, and freshly painted. The former chambers of a departed principal, dusted as if in anticipation of parent conferences, were spectral; the empty room next door had a hulking public-address console, with five microphones set at varying heights. It was as if everyone had evaporated overnight. The school administrator, Lee Youngmi, efficiently if warily welcomed me into a main office lined with spotless devicesâa spiral-binding machine, a laminatorâand offered me ginger tea and cookies. When sheâd first arrived, ten years ago, there were sixty students. But the surrounding town had since drained away. The large cattle market, which used to be candlelit until well after dark, is gone, as are the brewery, the lumber mill, the police station, and the post office. Parents fought to preserve the school as a center of civic life, but their children now complained that there was no one left to play with. Teachers called the current group of students, in a reference to an old Korean superhero cartoon, the Eagle Five Brothers. Lee was accustomed to solitude. When she left me in the room, she reflexively flicked off the heating. The sixth-grade teacher, Kang Wooyoung, a man in his twenties, had a similar air of resignation. His two students had been together since they reached school age. When I asked if they got along, he seemed baffled by the question: they fought sometimes, sure, but they didnât know any other children their age. âThe advantage is that I can be super intimate with the students,â he said. âThe disadvantage is that they cannot learn to socialize in a group setting.â One of his sixth graders was disabled; a special-education teacher was retained on his behalf, but the line item was hard to justify. The patterns of the childrenâs lives were unlikely to be upended by the arrival of a strange new kid or the torment of an unapproachable crush. The school may be closing next year. Kang had loved his first teaching job, his own childhood dream. But he didnât have any friends in town, either. The after-school program was about to start. It featured two options: 3-D printing and something Lee called âa new sport.â She could give me no details on the new sport, which was played on Tuesdays. In the past, they had offered volleyball, badminton, and soccer, but such extravagances required a critical mass. She let me wander the school, which felt like a museum of childhood artifacts: an unlit but well-stocked gymnasium, a darkened cafeteria outfitted with a little proscenium stage, enormous forsaken playgrounds, ballfields gone wild. The only apparent concession to the demographic reality was a robotic apparatus for playing Ping-Pong by yourself. The end of the world is usually dramatized as convulsive and feverish, but population loss is an apocalypse on an installment plan. At one point in âChildren of Men,â the protagonist, played by Clive Owen, regards a private archive of cultural treasuresâMichelangeloâs âDavid,â Picassoâs âGuernicaââand turns to its proprietor to say, âA hundred years from now there wonât be one sad fuck to look at any of this. What keeps you going?â The man responds, âI just donât think about it.â Aside from the blips of the Mongol invasions, the Black Death, and the Thirty Yearsâ War, the human number in Eurasia grew steadily, if slowly, for the bulk of the next two millennia. As the economist Thomas Malthus famously observed, the only effective deterrent to the otherwise consuming âpassion between the sexesâ was the fear that oneâs children would starve to death. Families were just large enough to compensate for the fact that nearly half of all babies born would never celebrate their fifth birthday. In about 1805, we crossed the threshold of a billion people. That had taken the entirety of human history. Our next billion took just a hundred and twenty-three years. This population explosion coincided, oddly, with a downward fertility drift in Europe. The pioneers were French aristocrats: in the interest of consolidating familial wealth and prestige, the nobility increasingly delayed marriage, and then sought to limit the number of offspring who might expect their share of an inheritance. This made sense. But the practices diffused, through mimicry, to the lower orders. This made less sense. Evolutionary imperatives, it seemed, could be eclipsed by cultural contagion. By the twentieth century, more rational explanations had caught up. An industrializing economy no longer required children to help on the farm. Women were free to enter the workplace. At the same time, improvements in medicine and sanitation radically reduced the rate of childhood mortality. Children became capital assets, and investments in their education were understood to beget healthy returns. Economists likened this to other consumer durables: as families get richer, they donât just keep buying cars; they buy nicer ones. If economic prosperity decreased fertility, it seemed intuitive that lower fertility should, in turn, increase prosperity. During the Cold War, population control came to be seen as a kind of master keyâa panacea for social and political ills. In a forthcoming book, âToxic Demography,â the scholar Jennifer Sciubba and her co-authors write that American ĂŠlites believed âpopulation growth caused poverty, and poverty caused communism.â It was in the best interests of the West, leaders such as President Lyndon Johnson affirmed, to subsidize the proliferation of birth control and sex education. It was unfortunate but apparently unavoidable that the principal instrument of family planning was the female body. The president of Planned Parenthood, an organization founded in alignment with the eugenicist sympathies of early-twentieth-century progressive movements, warned that an overly precious concern for âindividual womenâ would impede progress: âWe dare not lose sight of our goalsâto apply this method to large populations.â South Korea stood at the vanguard. A decade after the Korean War, the countryâs per-capita G.D.P. was below a hundred dollarsâless than that of Haiti. People ate tree bark or boiled grass, and children begged in the streets. After a military coup in 1961, the new authoritarian leadership tied its economic program to the cultivation of a citizenry that was smaller and better educated. It was an all-hands-on-deck approach to the labor force. Social workers fanned out to rural communities, where they encouraged women to have no more than three children. The government legalized contraceptives and pressed for the use of IUDs. These initiatives dovetailed with an emphasis on ethnic homogeneity and traditionalist values. Biracial children of American servicemen, along with the children of unwed mothers, were shipped abroad for adoption, and Korea became known as the worldâs largest âexporterâ of babies. The program was regarded as a smashing success. In the span of twenty years, Koreaâs fertility rate went from six to replacement, a feat described by Asian demographers as âone of the most spectacular and fastest declines ever recorded.â A crucial part of this plan was the educational advancement of women, which the same demographers called âunprecedented in the recent history of the world.â Far fewer Koreans came into existence, but those who did enjoyed a similarly improbable rise in their standard of living. Parents who remembered hunger produced children who could afford cosmetic surgery. Fertility all of a sudden seemed like a knob that governments could turn at will. It was simply assumed that the âdemographic transitionââthe shift from many deaths and many babies to far fewer of bothâwould settle naturally around the replacement rate. Like a restaurant at capacity, our unconscious maĂŽtre dâs would regulate our numbers on a one-in, one-out basis. It never really occurred to anyone that governments might want to turn the knob the other way. Except, as a Dutch demographer once dryly put it, âthe drive in human populations to procreate may long have been over-estimated.â When Korea neared replacement, in 1983, its leadership might have reconsidered its policies. Instead, it doubled down with a new slogan: âEven two are too many.â By 1986, the Korean fertility rate reached 1.6. This remained stable for about a decade, then fell off a cliff. The government has now devoted approximately two hundred and fifty billion dollars to various pro-natalist efforts, including cash transfers and parental-leave extensions, to no avail. Two years ago, the legendary feminist legal scholar Joan Williams was shown the most recent Korean fertility data for a documentary. She drew her hands to her face in open-mouthed shockâlike Edvard Munchâs âScreamââand the image instantly became a meme. Koreaâs demographic collapse is mostly taken as a fait accompli. As John Lee, the political analyst, put it, âThey say South Korea will be extinct in a hundred years. Who cares? Weâll all be dead by then.â The causes routinely cited include the cost of housing and of child careâamong the highest in the world. Very little in Korean society seems to give young people the impression that child rearing might be rewarding or delightful. I met a stylish twentysomething news reporter at an airy, silent cafĂŠ in Seoulâs lively Itaewon district. âPeople hate kids here,â she told me. âThey see kids and say, âUgh.â â This ambient resentment finds an outlet in disdain for mothers. She said, âPeople call moms âbugsâ or âparasites.â If your kids make a little noise, someone will glare at you.â She had recently vacationed in Rome, where adults drank at bars while their kids ran amok. She said, âHere, people would say, âWhat the hell are you doing?â â The online responses to media accounts of the crisis tend to be aggressively cynical: âJust wait, we can go lower than that,â or âYou canât just birth the slaves.â The reporter said, âWhen I write about this, I think, Well, what would change my mind? The answer is nothing. Itâs the norm not to want kids.â Like many Koreans, she dotes on her dog. Finding gifts in Seoul for my two little soccer fanatics at home required deliberate planningâI schlepped all over town looking for national-team jerseys in childâs sizes and had to settle for black-market knockoffsâbut there is a pet depot on practically every block. Last year, strollers for dogs outsold those for babies. She said, âIâm not saying people value dogs more than they value children.â She paused to gesture to the other patrons: âBut all you have to do is look around.â A childless vacuum, by this account, is the future liberals want. Kirkâs conservative compatriots point to such examples as the young progressive activist David Hogg, who once tweeted that he would âmuch rather own a Porsche and have a Portuguese water dog and golden doodleâ than have children. âLong term itâs cheaper, better for the environment and will never tell you that it hates you or ask you to pay for college.â These liberal caricatures perceive family commitments as a drag on âself-actualization,â which often becomes an excuse for hedonism. Conservatives instead call for a rehabilitation of family values. The âtrad wivesâ of social media make cornflakes from scratch and would never let their husbands milk the cows. As the self-described âdomestic extremistâ Peachy Keenan has put it, âThe home with the mom and dad is the little factory to produce the future, like, literally.â Others have reached for more nefarious explanations for languishing birth rates. Tucker Carlson made a documentary about âcollapsing testosterone levelsâ in America; a far-right influencer known as Raw Egg Nationalist blames endocrine disruptors in perfume. There is no evidence, however, that the epidemic is one of infecundity. It may be wishful to think so: itâs easier to avoid leaden dishware than it is to reinvigorate a societyâs desire for children. The narrative of moral decay also sits uneasily with the underlying data. In 2011, forty-five per cent of American pregnancies were unplanned. This has come down dramatically, in large part owing to an astonishing reduction in the incidence of teen-age pregnancy. Fresh-faced âtradâ milkmaids, for their part, do not seem to have more children. Where female professional ambition once tracked with smaller families, this is no longer the case: in Tunisia and in southern India, where women make up a very small fraction of the labor market, fertility has dropped below replacement. Recent research indicates that fertility rates now trend higher in countries where more women work. In America, the decline cuts across demographic groups. Even Mormons are barely replacing themselves. Carlson has accused liberals of a plan to replace native-born Americans with immigrants. Even if this were true, it might not be the most provident strategy. Studies have shown that newcomers from high-fertility countries tend to adopt the reproductive customs of their host nation within a generation. Hispanic women account for a large share of Americaâs recent fertility decline. Only two communities appear to be maintaining very high fertility: ultra-Orthodox Jews and some Anabaptist sects. The economist Robin Hansonâs back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that twenty-third-century America will be dominated by three hundred million Amish people. The likeliest version of the Great Replacement will see a countryside dotted everywhere with handsome barns. Fertility decline is a polarizing issue in Korea. Lee Jun-seok, a thirty-nine-year-old Harvard graduate who is sometimes compared to J. D. Vance, is the most popular conservative politician of his generation. We met late one Friday evening for beer and soju, and our conversation was interrupted every five minutes by drunk revellers who bowed deeply to him and took selfies. In the 2022 Korean Presidential race, Lee helped mobilize disaffected young men to turn out in support of the conservative candidate, who promised to abolish the gender ministry, which coĂśrdinates the countryâs equity policies. His victory, in what some observers called the âincel election,â prefigured Trumpâs triumph last year. Lee told me, âWhen many women get to thirty-five, they start bitching about being duped by the feminists who told them they could have it all. Itâs literally impossible for them to meet someone with the same socioeconomic status at that point, so they have to degrade themselves. Now half of us are unmarried, and Iâm part of that.â When I asked about his American analogue, he said, âJ. D. Vance should not have been talking in a way that stereotyped people.â He paused, then continued, âAlthough in Korea thereâs more of a reality of childless cat ladies.â If Koreans arenât reproducing, itâs not for lack of traditionalism. Their culture, as one pro-natalist told me, is already âbased.â Pornography and sex work are illegal, and abortion was decriminalized only a few years ago. A negligible proportion of Korean babies are born out of wedlock. Korean men donât do much at home, and those who do are often branded âpongpongnam,â a reference to dish soap that means âfoamy man.â Paternity leave remains relatively rare, and men who take it are called âlatte papas,â as if theyâre using the leave as a vacation. Women fear they are assigned low-level professional tasks in anticipation of their departure from the labor force. As Kim Jeongmin, the editorial director of the news organization Korea Pro, told me, âIn H.R. interviews, women feel pressured to show that theyâre so dedicated to their careers that they have no plans to get married.â The insinuation that women are at fault for the demographic crisis has turned gender friction into gender war. In 2016, the Korean government issued a âbirth map,â in which, as one blogger put it, âThey counted fertile women like they counted the number of livestock.â A conservative member of the National Assembly recruited his own chorus line to demonstrate a novel dance move he thought might help strengthen womenâs pelvic floors. Many young women now flirt with the â4Bâ mentality, a term for those who eschew dating, sex, marriage, and children; some even forgo friendships with men. Yeho, a nineteen-year-old sophomore at a prominent womenâs college in Seoul, described the routine misogyny of her male classmates in high school: boys habitually recited lines theyâd heard in porn, or illegally circulated pornographic memes. She had no interest in dating or children. She told me, âThey might not grow up well, or they might fall into an incel communityâand, besides, children arenât a necessary part of the good life.â Women in her motherâs generation often regretted the sacrifices they had been expected to make, and they raised their daughters to prioritize their careers. Yehoâs college has an anonymous Reddit-like forum. The basic ground rule, she said, was that âto give space to feeling good about men and relationships is to ignore or minimize the dark side. Posts about heterosexual romance require a trigger warning!â The most common such advisory is a derogatory portmanteau of the words âloveâ and âhate.â In one typical reply, a woman wrote, âCan you please stop posting about dating, itâs secondhand embarrassment? Your dick-to-ride-on is not special at all, seriously.â Koreans cite the pressures and costs of excessive education as a large part of their reluctance to have children. (American parents in liberal enclaves might share a version of these misgivings.) An auspicious Korean childhood culminates in acceptance to one of Seoulâs three most prestigious universities. Admission is primarily based on a studentâs performance on the national collegiate entrance exam, or Suneung, which is administered every year on a Thursday in November. The opening of the stock market is delayed that day, and many construction sites are closed. Bus and metro services are increased to ease traffic congestion. Students running late may avail themselves of a police-motorcycle escort. During the English-comprehension section, which requires absolute silence, air-traffic control suspends all takeoffs and landings. At some hagwons, fifth graders learn calculus. Elementary students take pre-med courses. Some focus on sports or musical instruments. Thereâs a Korean saying that âa dragon emerges from a small streamââthat talent can be identified and nurtured in any backwater. But the political analyst John Lee, who was once a hagwon instructor, was dubious about this meritocratic ideal: âI was given a score range for students. If I gave a score that was too high, the parents would think that their children should be at a âbetterâ hagwon. If I gave a score that was too low, the parents would think, This is wasting my money, itâs not working.â Some hagwons are extremely selective. As one young woman said, âIf you donât go to a certain one, youâre not part of the group.â Historically, at the strictest cram schools, social interactions were carefully circumscribed. Some forbade any conversation between boys and girls that were not directly related to study. Hugging, or the exchange of romantic notes, might have resulted in bathroom-cleaning duty. Four out of five children in Korea today describe school as a âbattlefield.â In 2012, the advocacy group World Without Worries About Private Education helped develop an ad campaign that showed a baby bottle full of fried rice, with a caption that read, âMom! Itâs too early for me.â Curfew laws prohibit hagwon classes after about 10 or 11 p.m. The issue nonetheless remains a society-wide prisonerâs dilemma, and even those who strenuously object in principle frequently relent in practice. When I visited the advocacy group, one employee told me, âIn the macro, everyone understands itâs a problem, but in the micro, for my family, and my kids, I have to do it.â When I commented that the children must be miserable, he corrected me: âIf you donât send them, the kids feel bad! Thatâs the only place they can see their friends, because no one is at the playground.â The leading cause of death among young Koreans is suicide. More than one Korean described their culture to me as âbroken.â It is not easy to opt out of the system. One morning, I met with half a dozen members of an unorthodox day-care collective in a neighborhood called Hapjeong. This patch of Seoul, they told me, was distinctive for its lack of chain stores, and they convened at an otherwise empty local bakery; it was next to a Starbucks, across the street from two other Starbucks, and catty-corner from a fourth Starbucks. Forty years ago, Seoul had practically no child care. Some working parents locked their children in their apartments and hoped for the best. Children died in house fires. In 2002, a group of grassroots organizers formed this communal alternative. The current parents were nostalgic for their own alleyway childhoods. An artist named Daum told me that, when he was young, âif you kicked a ball into someone elseâs property, you went and rang the doorbell and got it back.â That city no longer existed: âNow you get yelled atââYou couldâve broken my window!â â Thereâs a special word for noise between floors. Complaints forced Daum and his wife, Dani, to leave their previous building; one neighbor said, âI canât stand your children anymore!â The day care took the kids outside every day. They learned about plants and animals, and were taught to mark the seasons with the old festival days. The use of standard honorifics was discouraged, and children spoke to teachers in âhalf speak,â the register ordinarily reserved for informal address. The parents agreed not to send their children to hagwons for the time being. This ethic of mutual care had made parenting âless scary,â one mother remarked. Still, when their children aged out, they would be fed to the educational machine. Another mother said, âWhen they get to normal elementary school, the other little kids are already accustomed to a full-day scheduleâthey have more stamina, theyâre used to hagwonsâbut these kids are still used to nap time.â Hwang Ock-kyeung, the president of a government-sponsored think tank, told me that changes in policy canât mend a culture that marginalizes children. âMy own employees tell me their babies look alien to them,â she said. âYoung people want the government to increase the child-care hours, but then the time people spend with their children decreases!â An obsession with social status turns children into tokens of parental achievement: âMany parents take the subsidies and spend more money on extra hagwons, and that becomes a vicious cycle.â Enhanced professional productivity for parents, and the ability to enjoy oneâs free time, were not just collateral benefits. She added, âThereâs a reason that if you go to Daechi-dong youâll see hagwons and Pilates in the same building.â Given the stakes for reproductive autonomy, Doneganâs reservations are entirely comprehensible. Most left-leaning Americans are similarly distrustful of the pro-natalist discourse. Leigh Senderowicz, a feminist demographer at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, told me, âThere is fundamentally no way to do this that doesnât end up treating womenâs bodies as a tool.â According to the U.N., countries with pro-natalist policies tend to be less democratic. A baby-bonus initiative in Italyâs Piedmont region was given a name and logo that seemed an awful lot like an homage to Fascism. Eberstadt, the economist, told me, âIn China, the mechanics are in place to say, âOh, Iâm sorry, Miss Wong, you canât fly on airplanes anymore, because youâre unmarried.â â Local Party officials are already knocking on doors to track menstrual cycles. The Russian government recently passed a law that criminalizes âchild-free propaganda,â potentially including the representation of a happily childless couple on television or social media. Some progressives seem fine with child-free propaganda. The BirthStrike Movement proclaims that ânot having children is the single most impactful decision that a person can make to reverse climate change.â This might seem sensible, but depopulation will happen far too slowly to alleviate the worst effects of climate change. The children who would have traded their own existence for a cooler planet have already been born. In âWhat Are Children For?,â Berg and Wiseman suggest that such environmental logic provides a cloak of moral legitimacy for personal preferences that feel otherwise difficult to articulate. One scholar called this the âsocio-political weaponization of fertility.â Liberals are right to point to immigration as the obvious way to mitigate the economic effects of demographic contraction. Italy currently has a shortage of nurses, and Germany has a shortage of plumbers; a baby born today does nothing to unclog a DĂźsseldorf sink. Even immigration, however, is a stopgap measure: by 2100, ninety-seven per cent of the worldâs countries are predicted to be below replacement. In the meantime, pro-immigration policies will continue to generate nativist backlashes. Last year, Seoul sponsored a pilot program to import a hundred nannies from the Philippines. The project, despite its lack of ambition, was wildly controversial. This was perhaps unsurprising: Korean women have been known to berate their Vietnamese daughters-in-law for peeling apples in the wrong direction. American liberals are quick to associate the fear of cultural corrosion with xenophobia. But Korea was long a vassal state of China, and then a Japanese colony, so the question of civilizational survival has a slightly different valence there than it does here. And even liberals tend to get understandably sentimental about, say, the loss of linguistic diversity. The Finnish demographer Anna Rotkirch pointed out to me that fewer than ten thousand babies were born in Estonia last year. âWhat will happen to the Estonian language?â she asked. âSeriously, this is not a far-off thing!â The most sophisticated liberal arguments interpret fertility decline as a symptom of more serious underlying problemsâeconomic precarity and an âincompleteâ gender revolution. Men and women alike struggle to provide for their families, but the participation of fathers at home has not caught up to the participation of mothers at work. A more generous welfare state, and a more equitable culture, should therefore produce more children. This does not seem to be the case. Finland famously provides all new parents with âbaby boxesâ full of useful, high-quality products, and Sweden has normalized extended parental leave, especially for fathers, and flexible work hours. The Nordic countries are wonderful places to be parents, but their fertility rates are lower than our own. These trends are not reducible to budgetary concerns. Child care is virtually free in Vienna and extremely expensive in Zurich, but the Austrians and the Swiss have the same fertility rate. The incidence of childlessness among Democrats is significantly higher than it is among Republicans. This appears in part to be an artifact of educational polarization. Lower fertility rates seem correlated with the perception that proper child development depends upon enormous amounts of personal attention. Some economists attribute our recent fertility slide to a generational shift: people who were born in the nineties are less likely to remember a time when children were largely left alone. Working mothers today devote more time to active child care than stay-at-home mothers did in previous generations. Mothers with a college degree spend about four more hours per week with their children than mothers without one, and they are also less likely to live in proximity to extended family. In an economy biased in favor of highly skilled employees, a protracted education followed by a long career apprenticeship seems like the only way to secure a dependable income. But the longer people wait to try to form a family, the less likely they are to have one. We all might agree that everyone deserves the financial security to afford the number of children they desire. The word âafford,â however, means different things to different people, and in the coastal precincts of âachievement cultureâ it has been inflated to encompass individual bedrooms, piano lessons, travel lacrosse teams, Russian math, and single-origin organic peanut butter. For most of human history, having children was something the majority of people simply did without thinking too much about it. Now it is one competing alternative among many. The only overarching explanation for the global fertility decline is that once childbearing is no longer seen as something specialâas an obligation to God, to oneâs ancestors, or to the futureâpeople will do less of it. It is misogynistic to equate reproductive autonomy with self-indulgence, and child-free people often devote themselves to loving, conscientious caretaking. At the same time, we should be able to acknowledge that there is something slightly discomforting about a world view that weighs children against expensive dinners or vacations to Veniceâas matters of mere preference in a logic of consumption. It is a poignant irony that among Koreaâs few child-friendly places are former schools. In a picturesque river valley outside the northern city of Chuncheon, an old elementary school has been converted into a cafĂŠ and resort that resembles a high-end sanatorium, with blond wood and poured concrete. Alongside nostalgic references to the âinnocent smiles of children long ago,â its brochure offers a family photo-shoot package; the price includes basic retouching, although they promise not to âgo overboard.â For families who canât afford premium coffees, the Seoul government has repurposed a collection of rural schools as family campgrounds. One lies in the mountains not far from the D.M.Z.; I visited at the tail end of foliage season. An uneven parking lot had been outfitted with a matrix of black tents erected atop low wooden platforms. The old cafeteria featured a few game tables. A pink-sweatsuited adolescent played a desultory Ping-Pong match against his uncle. The boyâs father told me, âWe come here with our children so we wonât be bothered by other peopleâs judgment.â Outside, dry brown leaves blew around in a light rain, and most of the families huddled under awnings that had been installed to protect the tents. One solitary little girl played with a bright bird-shaped kite attached to a plastic fishing pole. As I left, I noticed a statue of a boy with a torch, identical to the one Iâd seen at the school in Haenem, but considerably the worse for wear. Countries have tried everything to reverse demographic collapse. In Hungary, women with four or more children gain a lifetime exemption from income tax. In Georgia, the Orthodox Patriarch offered to personally baptize any baby born to the parents of more than two children. Although some nations have stabilized at a low level, there is not a single modern example of one that has managed a sustained recovery from very low fertility to replacement. The worldâs most lavishly pro-natalist governments spend a fortune on incentives and services, and have increased the fertility rate by approximately a fifth of a baby per woman. Some observers believe that subsidies could succeed, but they would have to be on the order of three hundred thousand dollars per child. One smoggy morning, I visited Oh Se-hoon, the mayor of Seoul, at his City Hall office, which recalled the captainâs deck in a space opera. He has focussed primarily on the dire shortage of housing in Seoul, a city where almost fifty per cent of people now live alone. He listed his other initiatives: the Childbirth Encouragement Project, which included âeighty-seven subprojects,â and the Mom and Dad Happiness Project, which comprised âtwenty-eight subprojects.â While the Mayor lectured me, a large screen on the far wall ticked through an optimistic slide show of inverted pyramids and other fanciful renderings of urban futurism. When I mentioned that some demographers now regard population decline as a phenomenon to be managed rather than remediated, he intimated that voters were an obstacle to more profound adjustments. On my way out, two of his aides directed my attention to a lobby cafĂŠ where espresso drinks were prepared by a robotic barista arm. Some Korean companies pay their employees to have children, but the private sector now generally accepts that it must adapt to a world where children are luxuries. Analysts anticipate a hundred-and-sixty-billion-dollar âsilver industryâ to meet the needs of healthy pensioners. One travel agency expects that seniors, in the absence of grandchildren to spoil, will spend their disposable income on pricier trips. Conglomerates like Hyundai are planning high-end retirement communities for those who cannot rely on their families for eldercare. Companies that once catered to the mass market will have to pivot to a premium clientele. Samsung has long relied on wedding registries for the sales of large appliances. Cho, the celebrity demographer, praised a recent company plan to sell a few really fancy refrigerators in place of many adequate ones. The new line is called Samsung Bespoke. This eventuality had seemed remote. Then it more or less happened in Korea. When I asked Skirbekk if other countries might follow suit, he replied, âQuite a few, possibly.â Rotkirch, the Finnish demographer, underscored the notion that reproductive cues are social. âIn a forthcoming survey, I want to ask, âHave you ever had a baby in your arms?â â she told me. âI think in Finland itâs a sizable portion that hasnât.â These mimetic dynamics play out not just within countries but between them. Hwang Sun-jae, a sociologist who studies fertility norms, traces the swift dissemination of low fertility in part to social mediaâs role as an accelerant of global monoculture. It has never been easier to acquaint yourself with the opportunity costs of childbearingâthe glamorous destinations unvisited, the faddish foods uneaten. âPeople once had only local comparisons,â he said. âNow they see other peopleâs livesâin New York City and England and Franceâand they have a sense of relative deprivation: my life is not good enough.â The costs of an aging and diminished society feel more abstract. Last year, an online sketch portrayed a traditional Korean first-birthday celebration in ten yearsâ time: the World Cup stadium hosts the festivities for a crowd of ten thousand, including the countryâs President. Regular life, in the video, is peppered with minor inconveniences: food orders can take more than ninety minutes. The actual inconveniences might not be as minor. By 2050, Koreaâs labor force will be about two-thirds of its current size, and food delivery might be a thing of the past. Cho advised the Nongshim noodle company that it would soon be impossible to hire anyone in Busan, Koreaâs second-largest city. Retirement ages will continue to increase. Autocratic countries, where politicians can ignore older voters, might simply deny pensions to the childless. New forms of factionalism could test the limits of liberal coexistence. Younger workers in social democracies might increasingly resent the taxes they pay for entitlement programs that they will never themselves receive. Men, especially those of low status, are currently much less likely to have the number of children they desire, if they have children at all. If this trend continues, every election will be an incel election. In âThe Children of Men,â not the film but the original novel, by P. D. James, the social order cannot withstand such a void. Great Britain is an island of twilit senility overseen by a strict Warden. Basic infrastructure is shored up by an immigrant underclass, and the elderly are chained to barges that disappear beneath the sea. (A few years ago, Yusuke Narita, a Japanese economist at Yale, called upon Japanese seniors to perform seppuku.) Many Koreans told me that they look forward to a society with less competitionâa smaller, gentler world with a greater share of resources for all. In this picture, the future is exactly the same as the present, except with fewer people. It is just as probable, however, that inequality will increase. As universities close en masse, the remainder might prove even more selective. If Koreaâs labor force becomes insufficient to produce and distribute basic goodsâa distinct possibility by the end of the centuryâthey could be hoarded by those of means. The demographer Dean Spears noted that the more idiosyncratic our needs and desires the more we rely on the fact that other people share them: âIf you need specialized medical care, youâre less likely to find it in a rural place than in a big city, where there are more people who need the same sort of thing you need.â If current trends continue, in several decades there will be many fewer Koreans, and virtually all of them will live in metropolitan Seoulâa city-state surrounded by wilderness, ruin, and, if they are lucky, robotic rice cultivation. Economic prosperity has long relied on an expanding population to drive greater output, increased demand, and new markets. Advocates of degrowth have pointed out the manifest unsustainability of such intergenerational pyramid schemes, but their implosion will probably not be peaceful. If the bottom falls out of, say, the Chinese real-estate marketâamong the largest asset classes in the worldâthe entire global economy could totter. Iroquois âmourning warsâ against neighboring tribesâraids to replenish their own numbers with captivesâintensified in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, after disease and colonial violence depleted the nation. Russiaâs invasion of Ukraine seems to have been motivated in part by Vladimir Putinâs desire to increase the motherlandâs quantity of ethnic Russians. In a grotesque way, the âMad Maxâ scenario represents a comforting fantasy. A steampunk worldâwith war-making vehicles lashed together from old radiators and Atari circuit boardsâis at least a vital one. But a depopulated landscape might actually be characterized by quiescence. There is an extensive literature that links economic dynamism to youth. Young people, who have wilder imaginations and a greater appetite for risk, drive the bulk of entrepreneurial activity. For Elon Musk and his followers, children are technological lottery tickets: we never know which genetically enhanced baby might at last invent a functional warp drive. One technological pro-natalist told me, âWe do not exist just to consume, and we donât want the end state of humanity to be the Villages in Florida.â The most persuasive aspect of technological pro-natalism is not what we might theoretically gain from a larger population. It is the foreboding of what we might lose with a diminished one. The evolutionary anthropologist Joseph Henrich has summoned the example of the aboriginal Tasmanians, who were cut off from mainland Australia about ten thousand years ago. Their population was too small and too diffuse to preserve their expertise, and they apparently forgot how to make complex bone tools, how to make warm clothing, and even how to fish. And sheer numbers are only part of the story. For a culture to evolve, it needs a lot of different kinds of peopleâstubborn, nutty people with outlandish proposals. The weirdest people around are almost always children. Demographers often worry that indulging in sci-fi speculation might inadvertently prompt governments to adopt draconian measures. Still, the demographer Leslie Root admitted that she sometimes wonders, âIs it possible we actually evolved to be too smart for our own good, and weâre just too interested in other things to go along with the bullshit of having to have enough kids to perpetuate the species? I donât know! Maybe?â She collected herself, then added, âWhatâs most interesting to me, when I think about what it might be like to maintain a stable human population, is that thereâs a very real possibility that weâll need to reinvent society.â They met at a book club in 2016. Miji matter-of-factly characterized herself as âthe kind of person who is always swayed by other peopleâs opinions,â and she was drawn to Ho-gil for his independence. After five years of living separately, they decided to get married. She wanted a large, formal wedding, but he imagined something more intimate, and they compromised. Miji told me, âI canât ignore social norms, but I have to strike a balance between what society wants and his beliefs.â She hoped to have children, but at the time he felt âselfishââhe wasnât used to being around kids and wasnât sure what to do with them. He read some books about children, and they had a âvery intense debate and discussion.â She had no job security, and he told her, âIf youâre serious about this, change your job fast.â She found a position as a museum curator. Ho-gil told me that he âisnât interested in moving up the ladder,â so he wasnât worried that heâd be penalized for taking time off. But Miji seemed more ambivalent: âIf you have career ambitions, itâs really hard to make the decision to go on leave for children.â (She noted that she has been passed over twice for a promotion.) At the time, Gwangju offered a monthly payment to parents of about a hundred and fifty dollars, on top of a five-hundred-dollar subsidy that the federal government paid each month until the child went to day care. For Ho-gil, the money made the prospect thinkable. âAll his decisions were down to the numbers, and the numbers worked out,â Miji said. Their first child, Wooju, was born in 2022. When they brought him home from the hospital, the first thing they did was apologize to their neighbors, warning them that they âmight move around and make noise.â Fortunately, the elderly couple downstairs was âmore forgiving than most.â Miji and Ho-gil were very happy. It was easy to imagine having a second. Regional birth subsidies sometimes succeed on paper, but these statistics are artificially inflated by âtake and dashâ parents, who move to a place temporarily for the moneyâas if the entire country were playing a bizarro version of musical chairs. In 2023, Gwangju curtailed the subsidies. But, just as Miji became pregnant again, Gangjin, a small city about an hour and a half away, announced an offer three times as generous. As it happened, Ho-gilâs parents worked a farm there. Much of what Miji knew about the area was gleaned from a reality-television show about the renovation of ghost-town houses; her friends found the prospect of their moving to Gangjin inexplicable, even shameful. Still, this past October, the family relocated. On a weekday morning, they had me over to their tidy, spare apartment. One of the only adornments on the walls was a long-defunct video-intercom console, its molded curves like a âStar Trekâ fossil. The meagre trappings seemed like a defiant statement of their priorities, and the home was warmed by their togetherness. Their younger son, ten-month-old Eun-byul, was a round child dressed in a green bib that made him look like a little flower. He had only just begun to say âMommy.â They were impressed by how dissimilar the two boys wereâthe older one sensitive and introverted, the little one active and outgoing. Their lives are largely isolated. Theyâre grateful for the regionâs rural beauty, but the closest pediatrician is about a twenty-minute drive away. Miji said, âIf your baby isnât healthy, you canât live here.â They had noticed one neighbor with a baby, and they were hoping that at some point theyâd say more than âhello.â They have otherwise resigned themselves to the fact that theyâll have few opportunities to meet other parents until school begins, when theyâll join a parent group chat for logistics. The town features three places they can take the kids, including an indoor playground run by the local district office. They showed me photos of Eun-byul in a little sandbox on a linoleum floor. The townâs one âtrendy Instagrammable cafĂŠ,â as Miji put it, has declared itself a no-kids zone. They seemed pleased for the chance to discuss the banalities of rural family life. Mijiâs friends werenât interested in hearing about it. They told her, âOnce the children are older, youâll come back to Gwangju for their education.â Sheâd attended a hagwon to prepare for the college entrance exam, and she wasnât inclined to deny her children the same advantage. Ho-gil had not, and he didnât think it was necessary. In fact, he wasnât convinced that a college degree was essential, which to most Koreans is as radical as saying that he didnât need hot water. When they do return to their jobs, they will both face an hour-and-a-half-long commute each direction. They consider that a concern for another day. Ho-gil picked up Eun-byul, who bounced on his lap with a contented sigh. He said, âOf course I have doubts, and I wonder what my life would have been like if I hadnât chosen to have a family.â But heâd been wrong to assume, as his friends did, that âfatherhood eats away at your personal life.â Still, my (male, unmarried, dog-owning) interpreter, who told me later that such affectionate behavior was uncommon among Korean fathers, couldnât help but ask him, âArenât you bored?â The leap-of-faith argument makes sense only if we, and the society we live in, remain open to such transformation. In Korea, one graduate student told me, âThe standard life course is boring. Surprises are not virtues. We can imagine all of the things until we die.â Before the Asian financial crisis, in 1997, the economist Kim Seongeun told me, the top scorers on the collegiate entrance exam often went on to Seoul National University to study physics. When a faltering economy prompted large companies to fire their scientists, he observed, many parents converged on the idea that medicine was a safer path. It didnât take long for the top scorers to become doctors instead. Kim wasnât exempt from the tendency to hedge his bets: âHow can I place my own son in a small boat?â To become a parent at all, I remarked offhandedly, was to perceive all boats as too small. He laughed and thought for a moment, then said, âMaybe the low fertility rate here is because people are smart. The risk-free asset in a diversified portfolio is zero kid.â He just wasnât sure what to make of it all in the end. He said, âThe low fertility rate is not really good or bad. We just donât know.â This is the intellectually responsible position. Emotionally, itâs a little evasive. Rotkirch, the Finnish demographer, recalled a newspaper item in which a young woman asked why she should sacrifice her body and her partnership for a pregnancy. Such anxieties are a natural prelude to any vault into the unknown. Still, Rotkirch marvelled, âMy idea was that it just happens and itâs normal to be nervous.â Chang Pilwha, who has been an influential womenâs-studies scholar for forty years, echoed this bewilderment. âMany of my best feminist friends say the best thing theyâve ever done is have a child, and nobody should brand that as conservative or liberal,â she said. She is apprehensive about what society will look like once fewer and fewer people are parents. As she put it, âBecoming a mother or a father is a precious process of learning to be human, and the lack of that experience with vulnerability is only going to create more ruthlessness.â Child rearing is not a necessary condition for vulnerability. Itâs not even a sufficient one. But there may nevertheless be something irreducible about the shared experience of parenthoodâa life in which your fragile heart now seems to beat on the outside of your body. You see the guardians of a sleeping child on the subway and think, These are not just random strangers but fellow-passengers with utterly exasperating human beings for whom they would unequivocally die. Children have long played a symbolic role in a debate that was carried out far over their actual heads. For everyone who saw them as the ultimate affirmation of life itself, someone else saw our treatment of them as reason to despair. The poet Philip Larkin wrote, âMan hands on misery to man. / It deepens like a coastal shelf. / Get out as early as you can, / And donât have any kids yourself.â It didnât much matter. Most people went ahead and had them anyway. It seems as if we might now be transforming an old and insoluble philosophical conflict into an empirical experiment with real stakes. Sometimes it seems as though weâre in a hurry to do so. The fertility-rate culture war wields children as symbolic extensions of ourselves. People look to the birth rate as an index of what is normal, and no one is safe from the dread of judgment. Conservatives with large families fear they are seen as zoo animals. Liberals without children fear they are seen as selfish careerists or libertines. This may not just be a consequence of the fertility decline; it might be intensifying it. Children could survive being yoked to the value of humanity as a whole. It feels much more perilous to treat them as instruments of our own identities. Children are variables in our lives. But they are also strange birds of their own. Religious people talk about them as carriers of the divine spark, technologists as messengers from the future. Secular humanists are content to mumble something about the imagination. In any case, they should probably be prevented from sticking their fingers into sockets or setting fire to our homes. But we might otherwise trust them to figure out what they mean, or how to mean it. We might stand before them as models of humility and ambivalence. It is not fair for us, as individual parents or as a society, to expect them to bear the weight of our certainties. They are, after all, just children. âŚ
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OpenAI's Identity Crisis, Datacenter Wars, Market Up on Iran News, Mamdani's First Tax, Swalwell Out
Site: YouTube
(0:00) Bestie intros: Travis Kalanick joins the show!(0:42) Mamdani taxes the rich: new pied-Ă -terre tax coming to NYC(11:23) OpenAI's identity crisis: Leake...
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Media Meltdown: How Trump Outsmarted Iran While Critics Rooted Against America | Victor Davis Hanson
Site: YouTube
The legacy media, the so-called anti-MAGA Right, and the Democrat grandees in Congress have two things in common:They never wanted the U.S.-Iran war to go in...
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Iran in Shambles, Rubio Targets Regime Families, and the Return of the Impeachment Hoax | VDH
Site: YouTube
CNN and former Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes are of the opinion that President Donald Trump, who has chosen the sword over the pen, will get a ...
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Iran's Hormuz whiplash highlights divided regime. 'The fight between different factions has started' | Fortune Added: Apr 18, 2026
Iranâs Hormuz whiplash highlights divide within regime as U.S. blockade tightens: âThe fight between different factions has startedâ | Fortune
Site: Fortune
The Institute for the Study of War said in a note on Friday that the IRGCâs criticism of Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi is âreflective of broader divisions within the Iranian regime.â
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Muskâs SpaceX is shaping up as the biggest IPO on record. Itâs also bending the rules to do so Added: Apr 18, 2026
Muskâs SpaceX is shaping up as the biggest IPO on record. Itâs also bending the rules to do so
Site: The Conversation
Markets only work when everyone plays by the same rules, and right now, not everyone is.
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Site: X (formerly Twitter)
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Site: X (formerly Twitter)
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Site: X (formerly Twitter)
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The AI Doomers Who Are Playing With Fire Added: Apr 19, 2026
The AI Doomers Who Are Playing With Fire
Site: Gizmodo
For years, the dangerous rhetoric has been out of control. And things are turning violent.
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Democrat KICKED OUT of Party After Finding FRAUD, Disagreeing With Gerrymandering
Site: YouTube
WATCH THE FULL EPISODE HERE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jRFEjXHloPMSUPPORT THE SHOW BUY CAST BREW COFFEE NOW - https://castbrew.com/JOIN THE DISCORD: h...
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Trump Admin Preparing INVASION OF CUBA, Say Iran War ALMOST OVER| Timcast IRL
Site: YouTube
Text TIM to 36912 to get 60% off the BAERSkin Rain Jacket today! Or click: https://baer.skin/timGo to my sponsor https://venice.ai/tim and use code TIM to en...
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RunWithMoran.com Added: Apr 19, 2026
OUR PURSUIT ¡ LIBERTY ¡ LIFE â Mark Moran for U.S. Senate
Site: Mark Moran for U.S. Senate
OUR PURSUIT ¡ LIBERTY ¡ LIFE. Virginia First. America Only. No corporate PACs. No Wall Street donors. No AIPAC. The Common Benefits Plan â three bills, one machine, one direction.
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Site: X (formerly Twitter)
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Site: X (formerly Twitter)
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Site: X (formerly Twitter)
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Jordan Peterson battling serious neurological injury, daughter Mikhaila says Added: Apr 19, 2026
Jordan Peterson battling serious neurological injury as daughter reveals year of âhellâ
Site: New York Post
It comes after she announced last August that the Canadian author and commentator, 63, was diagnosed with chronic inflammatory response syndrome (CIRS), an immune system dysfunction.
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Site: X (formerly Twitter)
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Site: X (formerly Twitter)
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Trump, the anti-hero
Site: YouTube
Victor Davis Hanson tells Miranda Devine why Trump may be a villain to the radical left, but heâs the hero and leader America needs now more than ever.Please...
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What did Palantir CEO Alex Karp say about AI and the future of humanities jobs? - Google Search Added: Apr 19, 2026
Google Search
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Guayabo Zarandeao (feat. Luciana Mancini) | YouTube Music Added: Apr 19, 2026
Guayabo Zarandeao (feat. Luciana Mancini)
Site: YouTube Music
Christina Pluhar & L'Arpeggiata
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The Price of Peace | Fantasy Folk
Site: YouTube Music
EchoesOfVelandria
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Prison from Einstein on the Beach (arranged for Two Pianos) (feat. Anton Batagov)
Site: YouTube Music
Philip Glass
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Robo Cops Are Coming, Video of Robot Chasing Wild Pigs Goes Viral
Site: YouTube
WATCH THE FULL EPISODE HERE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TxDyYrShxbUSUPPORT THE SHOW BUY CAST BREW COFFEE NOW - https://castbrew.com/JOIN THE DISCORD: ht...
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Walk to School
Site: YouTube Music
Philip Glass & Paul Leonard-Morgan
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Sadness and Sorrow (Naruto OST) | Violin Cover by ViOLiNiA
Site: YouTube Music
ViOLiNiA Zhanna Stelmakh
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Do Not Listen After Midnight đ¸ď¸ The Most Ominous Neoclassical Piano | No AI Music | Rafael Krux
Site: YouTube Music
Rafael Krux
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Royal Fanfare The Entrance of The King
Site: YouTube Music
Rafael Krux
